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Abstract— According to the international Anti-Phishing Work 
Group (APWG), phishing activities have significantly risen over 
the last few years, and users are becoming more susceptible to 
online and mobile fraud. Machine Learning (ML) techniques have 
the potential for building technical anti-phishing models, a 
majority of them have yet to be applied in a real-time environment. 
ML models also require domain experts to interpret the results. 
This gives conventional techniques a vital role as supportive tools 
for a wider audience, especially novice users, in order to reduce 
the rate of phishing attacks. Our paper aims at raising awareness 
and educating users on phishing in general and mobile phishing in 
particular from a conventional perspective, unlike existing reviews 
that are based on data mining and machine learning. This will 
equip individuals with knowledge and skills that may prevent 
phishing on a wider context within the mobile users’ community.  
Index Terms— Anti-phishing; Cyber Security, Embedded 
Training; Smishing. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Phishing is an attempt to gain sensitive personal and 
financial information (such as usernames and passwords, 
account details, and social security numbers) with malicious 
intent via online deception (Aaron & Rasmussen, 2010; 
Ramanathan & Wechsler, 2013; Abdelhamid, 2015). Phishing 
typically employs identity theft and social engineering 
techniques, such as creating websites that replicate existing 
authentic ones. Through a seemingly legitimate email that 
contains a hyperlink, potential users are redirected to the 
malicious website in order to divulge their private information 
and credentials (Atkins & Huang, 2013). 
Advancements in computer networks and cloud technology 
in recent years have resulted in an exponential growth of online 
and mobile commerce, where customers perform substantial 
online purchases through their mobile devices (Abdelhamid & 
Thabtah, 2014). This online growth has led to phishing 
activities reaching unprecedented levels in recent months. The 
Anti-Phishing Work Group (APWG), which aims to minimize 
online threats (including pharming, spoofing, phishing, 
malware, etc.) has recently published a report about phishing 
activities in February of 2017 (Aaron & Manning, 2017). The 
report showed that there were approximately 1,220,523 
phishing attacks in 2016, an increase of more than 65% from 
the previous year with an average of more than 92,500 phishing 
attacks per month in the fourth quarter of 2016. As more and 
more users become prone to information breaches and identity 
theft, their trust in e-commerce or mobile commerce platforms 
will deteriorate, thus resulting in a huge loss of financial gains 
(Nguyen, et al., 2015). Existing reviews on website and email 
phishing, such as Mohammad, et al. (2015), Khonji, et al. 
(2013), Purkait (2012), Aleroud and Zhou (2017), and Jain and 
Gupta (2017) and Baadel and Lu (2018) have dealt with the 
problem from a technological solution perspective. Their 
reviews focused on broad anti-phishing techniques based on 
data mining, ML, databases, and toolbars, and only briefly 
discuss solutions such as awareness programs, user education, 
and training among others. Other recent reviews have dismissed 
conventional solutions outside ML as ineffective (Varshney, et 
al., 2016; Abdelhamid, et al., 2017). Therefore, the key 
objective of this paper is to raise awareness on the challenges 
of mobile anti-phishing techniques and why it is important to 
incorporate the traditional conventional techniques such as law 
enforcement, user training, and online communities in 
combating phishing attacks on mobile devices.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 
2 briefly outlines the smishing attacks procedure. In section 3, 
we outline the classification of mobile attacks. In Section 4, we 
list some of the challenges in mobile anti-phishing and outline 
the need for conventional techniques. Section 5 briefly 
mentions some of the conventional countermeasures. Finally, a 
brief summary and conclusion are provided in Section 6. 
II. SMISHING ATTACK PROCEDURE 
Following the launch of Apple Pay around the world in 2015, 
Samsung Pay and Android Pay made their debut soon thereafter, 
making mobile phones very attractive to cybercriminals (ISTR, 
2016). A spike in mobile device malware was noted in 2015 and 
2016 according to a report by the internet security giant 
Symantec (ISTR, 2017). The report highlights more than 18 
million mobile malware attacks on Android phones alone in the 
year 2016 compared to 3.4 million attacks just two years prior.  
Short Message Service Phishing (Smishing) aims to steal a 
user’s credentials over mobile phones in the form of text 
messages (Joo, et al., 2017). Phishers send malicious text 
messages with a link to users that either routes them to a 
counterfeit website or redirects them to fake app user interfaces 
(UI) through which the user gets spoofed and discloses their 
sensitive information (Felt & Wagner, 2011). While a web 
application keeps session cookies that store the user 
authentication credentials, a mobile application normally asks 
for user credentials every time the application is started, thus 
increasing the chances of a phishing attack to occur (Marforio, 
et al., 2016).   




Figure 1. Smishing Attack Life-cycle 
 
The Smishing procedure can be summarized as follows: 
a) A phisher creates a website or phony app  
b) He/She sends a Smishing text to a mobile phone. 
c) User received a text with a link 
d) Once the link is clicked, they are routed to a fraudulent 
phishing website or app.  
e) Phisher collects sensitive information from the user. 
d) Embezzlement successful.  
 
If successfully detected, ML tools will warn the user of the 
fraudulent link after step “c” above and prevents the phishing 
attack from happening if the user ignores the text or does not 
click the link. However, there are several challenges facing 
mobile anti-phishing tools that make it difficult for users to 
distinguish between legitimate and fraudulent links. Some of the 
challenges are discussed in the next section below. 
 
III. MOBILE ANTI-PHISHING CHALLENGES: THE NEED FOR 
CONVENTIONAL ANTI-PHISHING TECHNIQUES 
 
Marforio, et al. (2015), classified and listed five other mobile 
attacks as follows – similarity, forwarding, background, 
notification, and floating.  
i) Similarity attack – the phishing app has UI features that 
are similar or identical to the legitimate application. Users are 
thus spoofed into installing the phishing app as opposed to the 
legitimate one. 
ii) Forwarding attack – phishers take advantage of the 
forwarding functionality in an app. A user may be prompted to 
share their online game score or shopping experience with their 
friends on the social network. As the user clicks the link, the 
legitimate social network is not launched but rather a phishing 
screen that collects user credentials used to connect to the social 
network. 
iii) Background attack – the phishing app functions in the 
background and as the user tries to open a legit application it 
triggers itself to the foreground and displays the phishing 
interface. 
iv) Notification attack – the attacker generates spoofed 
notifications similar to that of the legit app and gathers the 
credentials entered as unsuspecting users click on them. 
v) Floating attack – a phishing app can draw a transparent 
overlaid input field on top of a legitimate password input field 
and obtain the password entered by the user.   
 
Few intelligent and classical solutions have been dedicated 
to mobile phishing, perhaps due to the number of resources 
needed to address the issue in mobile devices. Wu, et al. (2015), 
has suggested an anti-phish mobile tool for Android called 
MobiFish. The tool applies the whitelisting concept for phishing 
detection via mobile apps. It uses a text extraction tool, 
Tesseract, to verify the legitimacy of a website. 
Botazzi, et al. (2015), proposed Mobile Phishing Shield 
(MP-Sheild) for Android as a proxy service on top of a TCP/IP 
stack. MP-Shield extracts the URLs from the HTTP get request 
from the IP packets. The URLs are sent to Google Safe 
Browsing blacklist repository to check whether the URL is 
blacklisted or not.  
Joo, et al. (2017), suggested a Smishing detection method 
called S-Detector that collects the logs and timestamp of a 
smishing attack. The number or URL is run through a blacklist 
database to see if it exists. The algorithm goes further by 
detecting if an APK file is downloaded, which will be regarded 
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as an abnormal path and together with a risk weight value 
assigned through a Naïve Bayes algorithm flag the text message 
as a Smishing text attack.  
 
All of these approaches are Android-based only and rely on 
the data repository techniques of blacklist and whitelist; hence 
they face similar challenges discussed in table 1 above. 
Smishing text messages can be changed quickly and use URL 
shortcut services, enabling them to bypass blacklists and thus are 
becoming very difficult to detect (Joo, et al., 2017). According 
to Marforio, et al. (2015), a mobile app can be modified to allow 
the user to configure a personalized security indicator that will 
be shown during each login screen. This technique was tested in 
a study by Malisa, et al. (2017), which concluded that it was 
more effective on mobile apps. However, the effectiveness of 
any security indicators for mobile platforms requires user 
alertness and knowledge to identify spoofing apps from 
legitimate ones.  
 
Unlike phishing attacks on the PC, the attacks on mobile 
devices pose additional challenges to detecting and identifying 
phishing scams. These can be listed mainly as: 
a) They are difficult to detect visually by the users since their 
URLs are normally not displayed in full due to their limited 
screen sizes (Canova, et al., 2015; Varshney, et al., 2016).  
b) Complex anti-phishing solutions cannot run effectively on 
mobile devices due to hardware and resources limitations (Wu, 
et al., 2015). 
c) Mobile browsers are lightweight and have reduced 
security capabilities (Varshney, et al., 2016; Wu, et al., 2015). 
d) Mobile user habits allow for being easy prey to phishers. 
For example, shifting to other pages or apps on a mobile phone 
may be a bit cumbersome compared to a PC. Thus, mobile users 
will prefer to click on a link from an app instead and easily fall 
victim to a phishing link (Wu, et al., 2015).  
This gives conventional techniques a vital role to play as 
supportive tools to wider audiences, especially novice users, in 
reducing phishing attack rates in mobile devices.   
 
IV. SOME CONVENTIONAL ANTI-PHISHING COUNTERMEASURES 
 
A) Legislation 
Many countries have introduced legislation to combat phishing 
and cybercrimes. These include the Anti-phishing Act of 2004 
(USA), the Fraud Act of 2006 (UK), and Anti-spam Law of 2010 
(Canada) among others. Adopting organized crime laws to 
combat cybercrimes may give law enforcement enhanced 
investigative powers (Leukfeldt, et al., 2017). According to 
Larson (2010) and Cassim (2014), legislation should be 
designed to provide large-scale damage against individual 
phishers or secondary liability against Internet Service Providers 
(ISPs) in hopes that ISPs will be motivated to play their role in 
fighting phishing. 
 
B) Embedded Training and User Education 
Many researchers such as (Arachchilage, et al. 2016; Harrison, 
et al., 2016; Jensen, et al., 2017) have conducted studies on user 
training for raising phishing awareness. These studies involved 
either sending users an email with links and monitoring how 
they responded, or making the participants aware that a 
simulated phishing experiment was to be conducted and are 
gauged on their abilities to correctly identify phishing emails.  
At the end of the training, users were normally given the 
materials and informed about their vulnerability to phishing.  
 
Mobile game platforms bring an interactive and fun approach to 
education and training and are somewhat more effective 
compared to traditional articles or lectures. Users who 
participated in mobile game studies argued that mobile game 
based education was fun and gave them immediate feedback so 
that they were better equipped to identify a phishing attack after 
completing the game (Sheng, et al., 2007; Arachchilage & Love, 
2013). Users trained through mobile application had a higher 
success rate of identifying phishing sites compared to their 
counterparts who used traditional mediums (Arachchilage & 
Cole, 2011). 
 
 C) Online User Communities 
As users become more aware and are able to identify online 
scams or fall victim to phishing attacks, they may report their 
experience in order to prevent others from similar attacks. Users 
can report fraudulent websites or URL links that can then be 
stored in online databases. Such accumulated resources can also 
be used by researchers to study phishing scammers and their 
evolving ways of devising their scams. This collection of 
previously identified and detected phishing domain names, or 
URLs, is commonly referred to as a "blacklist". Some of the 
widely used and common online communities include Anti-
phishing Working Group (APWG), Phishme Blog, Symantec, 
among others. 
 
The above-listed communities serve as good examples of 
phishing URL databases available to users. These online 
communities play an important role in raising anti-phishing 
awareness and keeping the conversation progressing. 
 
These conventional anti-phishing countermeasures need to 
be developed and integrated through the mobile platform. Fun 
games and educational tutorials that educate users on phisher’s 
activities can be easily disseminated through commercial 
applications, such as banking apps, online transactions apps, 
popular online stores, and other social media platforms such as 
Facebook, Snapchat, etc. where it can have an instantaneous 
global reach and tremendous impact on user awareness. 
 
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
 
This paper discussed common mobile phishing attacks and 
some of the challenges in detecting and identifying mobile 
phishing scams. Unlike phishing attacks on a computer, a mobile 
scam is hard to identify due to the size of mobile devices, 
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smartphone resource limitations, and app design for mobile use. 
Some common conventional anti-phishing prevention 
techniques, including law enforcement, simulated training, and 
online communities were briefly discussed. The legislation 
provides law enforcement officers investigative powers to track 
cyber criminals. Educational training equips users with the 
necessary skills to identify a phishing scam. Online phishing 
communities accumulate data repositories that allow users to 
share useful information about phishing incidents, creating a 
knowledge base for online users. These conventional 
countermeasures need to be developed and integrated through 
the mobile platform through fun games, tutorials, and through 
social media platforms for it to have a significant impact and a 
global reach.  
  
In future work, it is planned to present a classical/conventional 
anti-phishing framework preventive layer with a thorough 
analysis and discussion on each of the countermeasures pros and 
cons to better equip companies, security experts, and researchers 
in selecting what can work well to equip individuals and 
stakeholders with knowledge and skills that may prevent 
phishing attacks on a wider context within the community. 
REFERENCES 
[1] Aaron, G., and Manning, R. (2017). APWG Phishing Reports. 
http://docs.apwg.org/reports/apwg_trends_report_q4_2016.pdf 
[Accessed   August 20th, 2017]. 
[2] Aaron, G., and Rasmussen, R. (2010). Global phishing survey: 
trends and domain name used in 2H 2009. Lexington, MA: Anti-
Phishing Working Group (APWG). 
[3]  Ramanathan, V., and Wechsler, H. (2013). Phishing detection 
and impersonated entity discovery using conditional random field 
and latent Dirichlet allocation. Computers & Security, 34, 123-
139. 
[4] Abdehamid, N. (2015). Multi-label rules for phishing 
classification. Applied Computing and Informatics 11 (1), 29-46. 
[5] Atkins, B., and Huang, W. (2013). A study of social engineering 
in online frauds. Open J Soc Sci, 1(03):23-32. 
[6] Abdelhamid, N., and Thabtah F. (2014). Associative 
Classification Approaches: Review and Comparison. Journal of 
Information and Knowledge Management (JIKM), 13(3). 
[7] Nguyen, L., To, B., and Nguyen H. (2015). An Efficient 
Approach for Phishing Detection Using Neuro-Fuzzy Model. 
Journal of Automation and Control Engineering, 3(6). 
[8] Mohammad, R., Thabtah, F., and McCluskey, L. (2015). Tutorial 
and critical analysis of phishing websites methods. Computer 
Science Review Journal, 17, 1–24. 
[9] Khonji, M., Iraqi, Y., and Jones, A. (2013). Phishing Detection: 
A Literature Survey. IEEE Surveys and Tutorials, 15(4). 
[10] Purkait, S. (2012). Phishing countermeasures and their 
effectiveness – literature review. Information Management & 
Computer Security, 20(5): 382-420. 
[11] Aleroud, A., and Zhou, L. (2017). Phishing environments, 
techniques, and countermeasures: A survey. Computer and 
Security, 68: 160-196. 
[12] Jain, A., Gupta, B (2017). Phishing Detection: Analysis of Visual 
Similarity Based Approaches. Security and Communication 
Networks, Volume 2017, pp. 1-20. 
[13] Baadel, S., Lu, J. (2018). Data Analytics: intelligent anti-phishing 
techniques based on Machine Learning. Journal of Knowledge 
and Information Management. In press. 
[14] Varshney, G., Misra, M., and Atrey, P. (2016). A survey and 
classification of web phishing detection schemes. Security and 
Communication Networks, 6266–6284. 
[15] Abdelhamid, N., Thabtah, F., and Abdeljaber, H. (2017). 
Phishing detection: A recent intelligent machine learning 
comparison based on models content and features. Proceedings of 
IEEE International Conference on Intelligence and Security 
Informatics (ISI), China. IEEE. 
[16] ISTR (2016). Internet Security Threat Report. Symantec, USA. 
Volume 21, page 10. 
https://www.symantec.com/content/dam/symantec/docs/reports/i
str-21-2016-en.pdf [Accessed July 18th, 2018] 
[17] ISTR (2017). Internet Security Threat Report. Symantec, USA. 
Volume 22, page 68. https://www.symantec.com/security-
center/threat-report?inid=globalnav_scflyout_istr [Accessed July 
18th, 2018] 
[18] Joo, J., Moon, S., Singh, S., et al. (2017). S-Detector: an enhanced 
security model for detecting Smishing attack for mobile 
computing. Telecommunication Systems, 66(1):29-38.  
[19] Felt, A., and Wagner, D. (2011). Phishing on mobile devices. 
Web 2.0 security and privacy workshop, Oakland, CA. 
[20] Marforio, C., Masti, R., Soriente, C. et al. (2015). Personalized 
Security Indicators to Detect Application Phishing Attacks in 
Mobile Platforms. Cryptography and Security. arXiv:1502.06824 
[cs.CR] 
[21] Marforio, C., Masti, R., Soriente, C., et al. (2016). Hardened 
Setup of Personalized Security Indicators to Counter Phishing 
Attacks in Mobile Banking. Proceedings of the 6th Workshop on 
Security and Privacy in Smartphones and Mobile Devices, 
Austria. Pp 83-92. ACM Digital Library. 
[22] Wu, M., Miller, R., and Garfinkel, S. (2006). Do security toolbars 
actually prevent phishing attacks? Proceedings of the SIGCHI 
Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems, CHI ’06, 
pp. 601–610 
[23] Bottazzi, G., Casalichio, E., Cingolani, D., et al. (2015). MP-
Shield: A Framework for Phishing Detection in Mobile Devices. 
Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Computer 
and Information Technology; Ubiquitous Computing and 
Communications; Dependable Autonomic and Secure 
Computing; Pervasive Intelligence and Computing 
(CIT/IUCC/DASC/PICOM). The UK. IEEE. 
[24] Malisa, L., Kostiainen, K., and Capkun, S. (2017). Detecting 
Mobile Application Spoofing Attacks by Leveraging User Visual 
Similarity Perception. Proceedings of the Seventh ACM on 
Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy. Pg 
289-300. ACM Digital Library. 
[25] Canova, G., Volkamer, M., Bergmann, C., et al. (2015). Learn to 
spot phishing URLs with the android NoPhish app. Information 
security education across the curriculum, 87–100. Berlin: 
Springer. 
[26] Leukfeldt, E., Lavorgna, A., and Kleemans, E. (2017). Organized 
Cybercrime or Cybercrime that is Organised? An Assessment of 
the Conceptualisation of Financial Cybercrime as Organised 
Crime. European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, 
23(3):287-300. 
424
[27] Larson, J. (2010). Enforcing intellectual property rights to deter 
phishing. Intellectual Property & Technology Law Journal, 
22(1):1‐8. 
[28] Cassim, F. (2014). Addressing the Spectre of Phishing: Are 
Adequate Measures in Place to Protect Victims of Phishing. The 
Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa, 
47(3):401-428.  
[29] Arachchilage, N., Love, S., and Beznosov, K. (2016). Phishing 
threat avoidance behavior: an empirical investigation. Computers 
in Human Behaviour, 60: 185–197. 
[30] Harrison, B., Svetieva, E., and Vishwanath, A. (2016). Individual 
processing of phishing emails. Online Information Review, 
40(2):265-281. 
[31] Jensen, M. L., Durcikova, A., Write, R. (2017). Combating 
Phishing Attacks: A Knowledge Management Approach. 50th 
Hawaii International Conference on System Science. The USA. 
4288-4297.  
[32] Sheng, S., Magnien, B., Kumaraguru, P., Acquisti, A., et al. 
(2007). Anti-Phishing Phil: The Design and Evaluation of a Game 
That Teaches People Not to Fall for Phish. Proceedings of the 
2007 Symposium On Usable Privacy and Security, Pittsburgh, 
PA.  
[33] Arachchilage, N., and Love, S. (2013). A game design framework 
for avoiding phishing attacks. Computers in Human Behavior, 
29(3): 706-714. 
[34] Arachchilage, N., and Cole, M. (2011). Design a mobile game for 
home computer users to prevent from “phishing attacks”. 
International Conference on Information Society (i-Society), 485-
489. 
 
 
 
425
